
IBS Center for Management Research

Starbucks' International Operations

*This case was written by **K.Subhadra**, under the direction of **Sanjib Dutta**, IBS Center for Management Research. It was compiled from published sources, and is intended to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a management situation.*

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Starbucks' International Operations

"Internationally, we are in our infancy."

-Howard Schultz, Chairman & Chief Global Strategist, Starbucks in March 2003.¹

"The expansion strategy internationally is not bulletproof as it is in the U.S."

-Mitchell J. Speiser, Analyst – Lehman Brothers, in June 2003.²

ALL'S NOT WELL WITH STARBUCKS

In March 2003, *Fortune* came out with its annual list of "Fortune 500 companies." For Howard Schultz (Schultz), Chairman of Starbucks Corp (Starbucks), this list was special as Starbucks featured in the list. It was a dream come true for the Seattle based entrepreneur.

Though the US economy was reeling under recession and many retail majors were reporting losses and applying for bankruptcy, Starbucks announced a 31% increase in its net earnings and a 23% increase in sales for the first quarter of 2003. Analysts felt that the success of Starbucks showed that a quality product speaks for itself. The fact that Starbucks spent less than 1% of its sales on advertising and marketing strengthened this view. In addition to being a popular brand among customers, Starbucks was also considered the best place to work due to its employee friendly policies.³

However, analysts felt that the success of Starbucks was primarily due to its profitable domestic operations. It was reported that although Starbucks had a presence in 37 countries around the world by mid 2006⁴, most of Starbucks' international operations were in trouble. Although the company had managed to gain a foothold in markets like China, it faced several difficulties in countries like Germany and France. Even in Japan, which was Starbucks' biggest market outside Japan, the company had had a difficult time for several years before it managed to stabilize in 2004. Analysts pointed out that Starbucks' international operations were not as well planned as its US operations. They also observed that the volatile international business environment made it difficult for the company to effectively manage its international operations.

Many analysts felt that it was important for the company to focus on its international operations. With the US market getting saturated, Starbucks would be forced to look outside the US for revenues and growth.

BACKGROUND NOTE

The history of Starbucks dates back to 1971, when Jerry Baldwin, Zev Siegl and Gordon Bowker launched a coffee bean retailing store named Starbucks to sell specialty whole-bean coffee in Seattle. By 1981, the number of Starbucks stores increased to five and Starbucks also established a

¹ Cora Daniels, "Mr. Coffee The man behind the \$4.75 Frappuccino makes the 500," *Fortune*, April 14, 2003.

² Stanley Holmes, Irene M. Kunii, Jack Ewing, Kerry Capell, "For Starbucks, There's No Place Like Home," *BusinessWeek*, June 9, 2003.

³ Starbucks was the first organization in the US to offer stock options and health care coverage to part-time employees also.

⁴ "Company Fact Sheet-August 2006," www.starbucks.com (accessed on October 6, 2006).

small roasting facility in Seattle. Around the same time, Howard Schultz (Schultz) who was working with Hammarplast – a Swedish housewares company which (marketed coffee makers) noticed that Starbucks, a small company from Seattle, was ordering more coffee makers than anyone else. In order to find out more about the company, Schultz visited Seattle. Schultz was so impressed by the company and its founders that he offered to work for the company.

In 1982, Schultz joined Starbucks as marketing manager, with an equity stake in the company. During his first year at Starbucks, he studied the various types of coffee and the intricacies of the coffee business. The turning point came in 1983, when Schultz was sent to Milan (Italy) for an international housewares show. There he observed that every street in the city had an espresso coffee bar, where people met and spent time. Schultz realized that Starbucks could introduce espresso coffee bars in the US. Schultz put forward this idea to his partners. But they did not like the idea of selling espresso coffee. However, after a lot of persuasion from Schultz, they agreed to allow him to sell espresso coffee in their retail shop. The business picked up and by the weekend they were making more money by selling the beverage than by selling coffee beans. Still when the partners refused to venture into the beverage business Schultz decided to quit the company and start out on his own.

In April 1985, Schultz opened a coffee bar – Il Giornale in Seattle, with a seed capital of \$150,000 invested by Jerry Baldwin and Gordon Bowker. The rest of the capital was raised through private placement. Soon, the second and third stores were opened in Seattle and Vancouver respectively. In 1987, when Schultz heard that Starbucks' owners were selling off six stores along with a roasting plant and the Starbucks brand name, he raised \$3.8 million through private placements and bought Starbucks. As Starbucks was a more established name, Schultz decided to retain it instead of Il Giornale.

Schultz expanded Starbucks to Chicago, Los Angeles, and other major cities. But with increasing overhead expenses, the company reported a loss of \$1.2 million in the year 1990. Schultz was however confident of his business plan and continued his expansion spree. He even hired employees from companies such as PepsiCo. By 1991, the number of Starbucks' stores increased to 116 and it became the first privately owned company to offer employee stock options. In 1992, Starbucks was listed on stock exchange at a price of \$17 per share.

The strategy adopted by Starbucks was to blanket a region with its new stores. By doing so it could reduce the customers' rush in one store and also increase its revenues through new stores. This helped the company to reduce its distribution costs and the waiting period for customers in its stores, thereby increasing the number of customers. It was reported that on an average a customer visited Starbucks stores 18 times a month, a very high number compared to other American retailers. By 1993 there were around 100 Starbucks outlets. This increased to 145 by the end of 1994.

Along with serving coffee, Starbucks also sold merchandise. In 1995, it started selling CDs of its famous in-house music program. It also entered into alliances with various players such as Canadian Airlines, United Airlines, Starwood Hotel, and Barnes & Noble Inc., to serve Starbucks coffee.

Analysts attributed the success of Starbucks' not only to its aggressive expansion, but also to its product innovation. Starbucks came out with new products to attract customers. For instance in 1995, to cater to the needs of diet conscious youngsters it launched *Frappuccino* – a low fat creamy iced coffee. In 1996, it launched ice cream and ice cream bars through its subsidiary Starbucks and Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. In the same year it also entered into an agreement with the cola major PepsiCo to launch bottled Starbucks *Frappuccino*. Due to all these initiatives Starbucks recorded an average growth of 20% per year since 1991 and its store traffic increased to 6-8% per year by the mid 1990s.

However, in the mid 1990s, with the market reaching saturation, Starbucks could no longer depend on the US market for growth. Analysts felt that to maintain its growth rates and to boost revenues, Starbucks should venture abroad. In 1995, Starbucks formed Starbucks Coffee International, its

wholly owned subsidiary to monitor the company's international expansion. In 1996, Starbucks entered Japan through a joint venture with the Sazaby's Inc (a leading Japanese teashop and interior-goods retailer) and over the years it expanded into South East Asia, Europe and the Middle East. By mid 2006, Starbucks had more than 3,400 stores outside the US (including company-operated stores as well as joint venture and licensed locations.) (Refer Table I for Starbucks' international presence).

Table I
Starbucks International Presence*

Country	Type of Entry	Name of the Partner	Year
Canada	Wholly-owned subsidiary	Starbucks Coffee Canada	1996
Japan	Joint Venture	Sazaby Inc	1996
Malaysia	Licensee	Berajaya Group bhd	1998
New Zealand	Licensee	Restaurant Brands	1998
Taiwan	Joint Venture	President Coffee Corp	1998
Kuwait	Licensee	M.H. Alshaya Co., W.L.L.	1999
China			
• Beijing	Licensee	Mei Da Coffee Co., Ltd.	1999
• Hong Kong	Joint Venture	Maxim's Caterers Ltd	2000
• Shanghai	Joint Venture	President (Coffee) Cayman Holdings, Ltd.	2000
Philippines	Licensee	Rustan's Coffee Corp	2000
Australia	Joint Venture	Markus Hofer	2000
Israel	Joint Venture	Delek Corporation**	2001
Austria	Licensee	Bon appetit Group**	2001
Switzerland	Licensee	Bon appetit Group**	2001
Germany	Joint Venture	KarstadtQuelle AG	2002
Greece	Joint Venture	Marinopoulos Brothers	2002
Mexico	Joint Venture	SC de Mexico	2002
Hawaii	Joint Venture	Café Hawaii Partners	2002
Hong Kong	Joint Venture	Maxim's Caterers Ltd	2000
Indonesia	Joint Venture	PT Mitra A diperkasa	2002
Puerto Rico	Joint Venture	Puerto Rico Coffee Partners LLC	2002
Lebanon	Licensee	M.H. Alshaya Co., W.L.L.	N.A
Spain	Joint Venture	Grupo Vips	2002
Cyprus	Joint Venture	Marinopoulos Brothers S A,	2003

Country	Type of Entry	Name of the Partner	Year
France	Joint Venture	Grupo Vips	2004
Jordan	Licensee	M.H. Alshaya Co., W.L.L.	2005
Ireland	Wholly-owned Subsidiary	Starbucks Coffee Ireland	2005
Bahamas	Licensee	Coffee Cay Ltd.	2005

* *This list is not exhaustive*

** *Starbucks closed its operations in Israel and bought out the stakes of its partners in Austria and Switzerland in 2003.*

Compiled from various sources.

INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION STRATEGIES

Starbucks decided to enter the Asia Pacific rim markets first.⁵ Growing consumerism in the Asia Pacific countries and eagerness among the younger generation to imitate western lifestyles made these countries attractive markets for Starbucks.

Starbucks decided to enter international markets by using a three pronged strategy – joint ventures, licensing and wholly owned subsidiaries (Refer Exhibit I for the modes of entry in international markets). Prior to entering a foreign market, Starbucks focused on studying the market conditions for its products in the country. It then decided on the local partner for its business. Initially Starbucks test marketed with a few stores that were opened in trendy places, and the company's experienced managers from Seattle handled the operations.

After successful test marketing, local baristas (brew masters) were given training for 13 weeks in Seattle. Starbucks did not compromise on its basic principles. It ensured similar coffee beverage line ups and 'No Smoking' rules in all its stores across the globe.

When Starbucks entered into a joint venture with Sazaby Inc. to open Starbucks stores in Japan in 1996, analysts felt that Starbucks was unlikely to succeed. They even advised Starbucks to forego its principles such as *No Smoking*, and ensure that the size of the stores would not be more than 500 sq ft due to the high rents in Japan. However, Starbucks stuck to its *No Smoking* principle, which attracted young Japanese women to the Starbucks stores, and the size of the stores was 1200-1500 sq ft – similar to the stores in the US.

According to Starbucks sources, listening to its local partner also helped. Starbucks took advantage of its local partner Sazaby's knowledge about Japanese coffee drinking habits and introduced new products such as Green Tea Frappuccino, which became popular.

Starbucks entered China in 1999. The first store opened in Beijing and was operated under license by Mei Da Coffee Co., Ltd. In 2000, Starbucks entered into joint ventures with Hong Kong based Maxim's Caterers, to open stores in Hong Kong and Macau, and with President (Coffee) Cayman Holdings, Ltd to open stores in the Shanghai region.

Starbucks was successful in attracting a young crowd in all its Asian markets, as young people in these markets were eager to imitate the American culture. It even adapted itself to the local culture to gain market acceptance. For instance Starbucks offered – curry puffs and meat buns in Asian markets as Asians generally prefer to eat something while having coffee.

⁵ Asia Pacific rim markets consist of – Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, China, South Korea, North Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea.

Analysts felt that the strong coffee drinking culture in Europe posed both challenges and opportunities for Starbucks. It would face tough competition from the sidewalk cafes of France, coffeehouses of Vienna, and espresso bars of Italy, that had developed a strong coffee drinking culture across the continent, exposing Europeans to the best coffee in the world. However, Starbucks executives commented that Europe used to make great coffees but by the late 1990s, the taste had gone awry. In 1998, Starbucks opened its first store in England, and soon expanded its presence to Switzerland, Germany and Greece.

It was generally felt that though old people would stick to the existing coffee houses, the young would be attracted to Starbucks. Said Helmut Spudich, editor, *Der Standard* (a Vienna based paper), "The coffeehouses in Vienna are nice, but they are old. Starbucks is considered hip."⁶ Another important factor that could lead to the success of Starbucks in Europe was its ambience and *No Smoking* environment, unlike traditional European coffee bars. The self-service mode of operation also attracted the young crowd as it was observed that youngsters did not like to wait for the waiter to come and take orders. According to Starbucks sources, it was successful because it was not just selling coffee but an experience, which was unique only to Starbucks stores. Peter Maslen, the President of Starbucks International, said, "The coffee is good but it's just the vehicle. The romance of coffee, the occasion, the community, is what Starbucks is selling."⁷

In the Middle East, Starbucks went in for licensing (except in Israel where it had a joint venture). The Middle East license agreement with M.H. Alshaya Co., W.L.L., covered seven countries: Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar. Respecting the culture in the Middle East, Starbucks stores offered a segregated section for ladies.

In September 2002, Starbucks announced that it would increase the number of international stores to 10,000 by 2005. However, analysts pointed out that it would be difficult for Starbucks, to make profits in international markets, and they were soon to be proved right.

PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

In the early 2000s, Starbucks faced many problems in its international operations (Refer Exhibit II for risks in international markets). The volatile political environment in the Middle East created serious problems for Starbucks. In July 2002, Arab students gave a call for a boycott of American goods and services, due to the alleged close relationship between the US and Israel. The boycott targeted US companies including Starbucks, Burger King, Coca Cola and Estée Lauder. Starbucks topped the list of companies to be boycotted due to Schultz's alleged closeness to the Jewish community⁸.

The problem was aggravated when it was reported that, in one of his lectures to students at the University of Washington, Schultz had said, "one of my missions is to sensitize you; you should not be immune to what is happening in the world. I travel a great deal and one of the things that I see is the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe, especially France and England."⁹ His address to Jewish Americans made matters worse. Schultz said, "What is going on in the Middle East is not an isolated part of the world. The rise of anti-Semitism is at an all time high since the 1930s. Palestinians aren't doing their job, they're not stopping terrorism."¹⁰ These comments from Schultz resulted in angry protests from the Arab countries and pro-Palestinian groups across the Middle East and Europe. Analysts felt that Schultz's comments strengthened the feeling that he was acting as an Israeli mouthpiece.

⁶ "Planet Starbucks," *BusinessWeek*, September 9, 2002.

⁷ "Starbucks Jolts Europe's Coffee Houses," *Seattle Times*, May 19, 2002.

⁸ In 1998, Schultz was honored with the 'Israeli 50th Anniversary Tribute Award' by the Jerusalem Fund of Aish Ha-Torah (a group supporting Israel).

⁹ "Starbucks: The Cup that Cheers," *www.zmag.org*, July 11, 2002.

¹⁰ "Starbucks: The Cup that Cheers," *www.zmag.org*, July 11, 2002.

Starbucks distanced itself from Schultz's comments, saying that they represented his personal beliefs and not those of the company. Schultz also denied allegations that he was anti-Palestinian and released a personal statement, saying that "my position has always been pro-peace and for the two nations to co-exist peacefully."¹¹ In addition to the above incidents, the US declaration of war on Iraq in early 2003 made matters worse for the company. Due to increasing security threats, Starbucks closed down its six stores in Israel.

Starbucks also faced criticism from non governmental organizations (NGOs) who urged the company to acquire certified coffee beans, ensuring that those coffee beans were grown and marketed under certain economic and social conditions. Starbucks also faced problems due to economic recession in countries such as Switzerland, Germany and Japan in early 2000s, where it experienced declining sales and revenues. Starbucks faced stiff competition, high business development costs and resistance from customers in international markets.

By late 1990s, Starbucks noticed that store traffic in Japan, its largest overseas market, was falling. It was observed that over a period of time, after the novelty wore off, customers opted for other stores, as they did not like the taste of Starbucks coffee. Commented a customer, "I never go to Starbucks if I can help it. The coffee tastes artificial."¹² The Starbucks sales in Japan declined by over 17% in 2002. In order to boost its sales, it even introduced food items like rice & salmon wraps, white peach muffins; however, it still failed to gain market acceptance.

In May 2003 Starbucks' Japanese business, announced an annual loss of \$3.9 million on revenues of \$467 million.¹³ Analysts felt that one of the main reasons for this was Starbucks' rapid expansion in Japan, which resulted in stores eating into each others' business.

After this, Starbucks announced that it would slow the pace at which it opened new stores in Japan. The company said it would open between 70 and 75 stores in 2003, as opposed to the 108 stores opened the previous year. "The Starbucks boom is over in Japan," said Seiichiro Samejima (Samejima), an analyst at Ichiyoshi Research Institute Inc., a stock rating company in Japan. "They continue to cannibalize their own market by opening new stores, and the quality of their food is not yet competitive with other chains."¹⁴

In Europe Starbucks faced stiff competition from well-established local players who offered specialty coffee at lower prices. Reportedly, in European markets, Starbucks was perceived as an "overpriced imitator of the real thing."¹⁵ For example in England, while the Starbucks tall latte coffee was sold at \$2.93, the same was available for \$2.12 at the local coffee shop.

Even in Germany, which had the largest number of Starbucks stores in Europe, the company faced stiff competition from many local coffee shops, which imitated the 'Starbucks experience'. Eventually, in November 2004, Starbucks acquired the 82% stake held by its German partner, KarstadtQuelle AG¹⁶, after the latter said that it wanted to focus on its core department-store businesses. At the end of 2004, Starbucks had only 35 stores in Germany. The company had announced previously that its goal was to open 200 stores in the country by the end of 2006. However, considering the slow pace of store openings, analysts were doubtful that that it would achieve its goal.

¹¹ "Starbucks: The Cup that Cheers," *www.zmag.org*, July 11, 2002.

¹² "For Starbucks, There's No Place Like Home," *BusinessWeek*, June 9, 2003.

¹³ "For Starbucks, There's No Place Like Home," *BusinessWeek*, June 9, 2003.

¹⁴ Ian Messer, "Japan's Coffee Shops Spill Over," *Bloomberg News*, May 21, 2003

¹⁵ "For Starbucks, There's No Place Like Home," *BusinessWeek*, June 9, 2003.

¹⁶ KarstadtQuelle AG was the largest departmental store in Europe. It was created in 1999 through the merger of Karstadt Warenhaus AG, which was founded in 1920, and Quelle Schickedanz AG & Co, founded in 1927.

Starbucks entered France, a country known for its coffee drinking culture, in early 2004, by opening its first store in Paris. The company formed a 50-50 joint venture with Madrid-based restaurant and retail firm Grupo Vips, which was also the chain's partner in Spain. In France, Starbucks faced competition from more than 50,000 traditional French cafes where the French habitually went for their coffee. Most of these cafes served traditional strong French coffee, and unlike Starbucks, most of them allowed smoking¹⁷. Analysts felt that Starbucks would find it difficult to draw away customers from the smaller cafes to its Americanized coffee.

Another challenge for Starbucks in France was high real estate and labor costs. Starbucks had opened stores in high traffic tourist areas in Paris and other parts of France, where the real estate costs were very high. Besides, the cost of labor was also higher in France than in most of Starbucks' other markets. For instance, the minimum wage in France, at \$9.92 an hour, was 93% higher than the hourly minimum wage of \$5.15 in the US.¹⁸

Starbucks had to adapt itself to suit French tastes. The company modified many of its food items and introduced several new items to match the French taste. In addition to this, although the company persisted with its *No Smoking* policy within the stores, it offered pavement seating and service, where people could smoke.

In spite of this, Starbucks never really managed to take off in France. Even in 2006, two years after the first store opened in the country, it was observed that most of the people who frequented Starbucks in France were American and Asian tourists, along with a few locals looking for a change. Although Starbucks did not disclose whether or not it was profitable in France, it was widely believed that the company was not profitable. "I think it's losing a phenomenal amount of money here," said Ralph Hababou, co-founder of Columbus Cafe, a French coffee store chain and a major rival of Starbucks in France. "The cost of hiring employees and buying leases is simply too high."¹⁹

It was observed that Starbucks was unable to earn more revenues from its international operations due to its complex joint ventures and licensing agreements. While the company invested huge amounts in imparting training to the employees and promoting its products, it earned only a percentage share in total profits and royalty fees. It was further felt that the company did not have any control over the operational costs.

In addition to its problems in international markets, Starbucks experienced operational problems due to lack of a trained workforce and suitable real estate for its stores. Commenting on the operational hindrances faced by Starbucks, Maslen said, "If we could train the people and find the real estate, the expansion could happen tomorrow, almost. There is demand."²⁰

In order to have better control over operational costs, Starbucks decided to go for new suppliers for items such as mugs. It was reported that the company was thinking of sourcing mugs from low cost Japanese vendors rather than importing them from the US, and planning to source its paper goods (such as plates and cups) from Southeast Asia.

Company sources also revealed that Starbucks would close down its loss making stores. However, analysts pointed out that closing down the loss making stores, and adopting cost cutting would increase profitability only in the short run and not drive future growth.

In late 2005, in an effort to reestablish its presence in the lucrative Japanese market, Starbucks entered the ready-to-drink coffee segment. The company launched 'Starbucks Discoveries', a ready-to-drink coffee product that was retailed through convenience stores. Starbucks Discoveries was initially launched in two flavors – Seattle, a latte, and Milano, an espresso.

¹⁷ In October 2006, the French government announced that it would impose a ban on smoking in public places from February 2007, and from smoking in bars, restaurants, hotels and night clubs by early 2008.

¹⁸ Eric Wahlgren, "Will Europe Warm to Starbucks?" *BusinessWeek*, January 24, 2005.

¹⁹ Rachel Tiplady, "Can Starbucks Blend into France," *BusinessWeek*, April 20, 2006.

²⁰ "Starbucks Jolts Europe's Coffee Houses," *Seattle Times*, May 19, 2002.

Starbucks announced that its decision to enter the ready-to-drink coffee segment was based on research conducted by the company, which indicated that Asian consumers thought chilled coffee had the highest quality of all ready-to-drink coffee beverages. In addition to this, most Starbucks customers in Asia believed that chilled-cup coffee was the best way for Starbucks to enter the market outside of their retail stores. The company claimed that Starbucks Discoveries was made fresh and kept refrigerated. It also had a short shelf life of 14-days – one of the shortest for similar products on the market at that time.

In February 2006, Starbucks Japan, posted a profit increase of 30% for the previous nine months helped by strong sales of seasonal drinks and food. The company observed that more customers were ordering food to go with their coffee, and increased the number of food items it offered. Reportedly, in early 2006, one store in Tokyo carried more than 60 different food items.

However, one market where Starbucks had managed to gain a strong foothold was China. After it opened the first store in 1999, the company had expanded to more than 200 stores by the end of 2005.²¹ Analysts said that it was noteworthy that Starbucks had managed to expand in China, a tea-drinking nation. In June 2005, Starbucks increased its stake in its joint venture with Maxim's Caterers in Hong Kong from 5 % to 51 %.²² The company also announced that it believed that China would eventually be its largest market outside the US.²³

OUTLOOK

In fiscal year 2005, Starbucks' revenues from international operations formed 16% of the company's total revenues.²⁴ During the year, the company had opened 1,672 stores around the world, including the first ones in the Bahamas, Jordan and Ireland.²⁵

By early 2006, Starbucks had more 11,000 stores around the world.²⁶ The company announced that it was looking at other new markets for expansion. It had identified India as one of the potential markets, and was targeting metros like Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai as the entry points into the market. Starbucks also announced that it was looking at Brazil and Russia as other potential markets in 2006-2007.²⁷

Analysts pointed out that Starbucks should rethink its entry strategy in international markets and focus on pricing to achieve real success. They also cautioned Starbucks against the external risks resulting from volatile political and business environments across the world. They felt that with increasing tensions between America and the rest of the world, the business environment especially in the Middle East and South East Asian regions was becoming increasingly volatile. Acknowledging the risks involved in the international markets, Schultz said, "We're not taking our success for granted. We also understand that the burden of proof at times is on us given the fact that a lot is being written and there's more sensitivity than ever before about America and American companies. These are the very early days for the growth and development of the company internationally. Clearly there's a big world out there for Starbucks to expand in."²⁸ Only time can tell whether Starbucks will be able to brew its success in the international markets.

²¹ Annual Report 2005, www.starbucks.com

²² "Starbucks: A Great Leap Forward," Drinks Business Review, www.drinks-business-review.com, September 22, 2005.

²³ Annual Report 2005, www.starbucks.com

²⁴ Annual Report 2005, www.starbucks.com

²⁵ Annual Report 2005, www.starbucks.com

²⁶ "Company Timeline-August 2006," www.starbucks.com

²⁷ Annual Report 2005, www.starbucks.com

²⁸ "Starbucks Backlash: The Java Giant's Expansion Brews Dissent Overseas," www.globalexchange.org, April 16, 2003.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION:

1. Analysts feel that MNCs can mitigate some of the risks in international markets by deciding on a suitable mode of entry into these markets. Analyze the entry strategies adopted by Starbucks for its international expansion.
2. Careful analysis and management of risks not only mitigate losses but also provide superior returns. In the light of this statement do you think Starbucks did not analyze and manage the risks involved in the different markets it entered?
3. A company faces diverse set of risks in international markets. What were the risks faced by Starbucks in its international operations? Explain how Starbucks can reduce risks in its international business.

Exhibit I**Modes of Entry into International Markets**

There are six ways to enter a foreign market. They are: exporting, turnkey projects, licensing, franchising, joint venture with a host country firm and setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary in the host country. Each mode of entry has its advantages and disadvantages. The method a company chooses depends on a variety of factors including the nature of the particular product or service and the conditions for market penetration in the foreign target market.

Exporting

Most firms begin their global expansion with exports and later switch over to another mode. In the 1990s, the volume of exports in the world economy had increased significantly due to the decline in trade barriers. However, exporting still remains a challenge for smaller firms. Firms planning to export must identify foreign market opportunities, familiarize themselves with the mechanics of exports and learn to deal with foreign exchange risk.

Turnkey Projects

In a turnkey project, the contractor handles every aspect of the project for a foreign client including the training of operating personnel. After the completion of the contract, the foreign client is handed the 'key' to the plant that is ready for operation. Turnkey projects are common in chemical, pharmaceutical and petroleum refining industry.

Licensing

Licensing is an arrangement whereby a company (licensor) grants the rights to intangible property like patents, inventions, formula, process, designs, copyrights and trademarks to another company (licensee) for a specified period of time. The licensor receives a royalty fee from the licensee. For example, in the early 1960s, Xerox licensed its patented xerographic know-how to Fuji-Xerox. It was initially meant for ten years; but the license was extended several times. In return, Fuji-Xerox paid Xerox a royalty fee equal to 5% of the net sales revenue that it earned.

Franchising

Franchising is similar to licensing except that it requires long-term commitments. In franchising, the franchiser not only sells intangible property to the franchisee, but also insists that the franchisee abide by the rules of business. In some cases, the franchiser also assists the franchisee in running the business. The franchiser receives a royalty payment that is usually a percentage of the franchisee's revenues. Service companies usually opt for franchising. For example, McDonald's pursues its expansion abroad through franchising. McDonald's sets down strict rules for the franchisees to operate their restaurants. The rules extend to cooking methods, staffing policy, and design and location of the restaurants. McDonald's also organizes the supply chain and provides management training and financial assistance to the franchisees.

Joint Ventures

In contrast to licensing and franchising arrangements, joint ventures allow companies to own a stake and play a role in the management of the foreign operation. Joint ventures require more direct investment and training, management assistance and technology transfer. Joint ventures can be equity or non-equity partnerships. Equity joint ventures are contractual arrangements with equal partners. Non-equity ventures are the ones where the host country partner has a greater stake. In some countries, a joint venture is the only way for a foreign company to set up operations.

Wholly Owned Subsidiaries

In a wholly owned subsidiary, the firm owns 100% of the stock of the subsidiary. Wholly owned subsidiaries can be established in a foreign country in two ways. A firm can set up new operations in the foreign country or it can acquire a firm and promote its products through that firm.

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The following are the advantages and disadvantages of various entry modes.

Entry Mode	Advantage	Disadvantage
Exporting	Ability to realize location and experience curve economies	High Transport Costs Trade Barriers Problems with local marketing agents
Turnkey Contracts	Ability to earn returns from process technology skills in countries where FDI is restricted	Creating efficient competitors Lack of long term market presence
Licensing	Low development costs and risks	Lack of control over technology Inability to realize location and experience curve economies Inability to engage in global strategic coordination
Joint Ventures	Access to local partner's knowledge Sharing development costs and risks Politically acceptable	Lack of control over technology Inability to engage in global strategic coordination Inability to realize location and experience economies
Wholly owned subsidiaries	Protection of technology Ability to engage in global strategic coordination Ability to realize location and experience economies	High costs and risks

Compiled from various sources.

Exhibit II**Types of Risk in International Business**

Typically a firm operating internationally is exposed to different types of risk. These can be listed as - environmental, financial, organizational or strategic risks.

Strategic Risk

MNCs typically face a diverse set of risks all of which cannot be assessed quantitatively. Michael Porter defines five forces impacting a firm's competitiveness-threat of substitutes, threat of new entrants in the industry, bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of customers and the intensity of competition within the industry. A firm's strategic decisions to respond to the above- mentioned five forces are a source of risk.

Operational Risk

Operational risk arises out of factors internal to the company such as machinery breakdown, industrial strife, supply and distribution imperfections, excess or shortfall in inventory etc. It causes a down-time in the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. Reducing costs by eliminating wastage, reducing variances and lead-time by improving processes are important to bring about global efficiency. The more the number of parts and processes involved in production, the greater the risk of not achieving the desired quality and productivity standards.

Political Risk

Political risk refers to political actions that have a negative impact on the firm's value. The process of establishing a cause-and-effect relationship between political factors and business income is called political risk analysis. Political risk is not confined to developing countries. It exists even in highly industrialized economies. While macro-political risks such as war and anti-globalization efforts affect the value of all firms in the country, micro-political risks like regulation of certain industries affect the value of a firm or firms within that industry, adversely.

Country Risk

Country risk is a wider concept that encompasses economic conditions, government policies, political conditions and security factors. The challenge of country risk analysis is in the aggregation of risk factors.

Technological Risk

Technological risk means the probability of adverse effects on business due to factors like obsolescence of an existing technology, development costs of new technology, failure of a new technology and security concerns of electronic transactions.

Environmental Risk

Environmental risk can be of two forms. The company may incur regulators' wrath because it polluted the environment, or there may be a public outcry in the event of an environmental damage caused by the company. Environment risk management might not provide short-term gains like financial risk management does. But in the long run, it can certainly become a source of competitive advantage and also enhance the corporate image.

Compiled from various sources.

Exhibit III

Starbucks: Annual Income Statement

(All amounts in millions of US Dollars except per share amounts)

Particulars	Sep 05	Sep 04	Sep 03	Sep 02	Sep 01	Sep 00
Revenue	6,369.3	5,294.3	4,075.5	3,288.90	2,649.00	2,169.20
Cost of Goods Sold	2,605.2	2,191.4	1,685.9	2,582.70	2,068.00	1,684.30
Gross Profit	3,764.1	3,102.8	2,389.6	706.20	581.00	484.90
Gross Profit Margin (%)	59.1	58.6	58.6	21.50	21.90	22.40
SG&A Expense	2,606.2	2,169.0	1,699.6	202.20	151.40	110.20
Depreciation & Amortization	377.3	325.6	265.3	221.10	177.10	142.20
Operating Income	780.6	608.2	424.7	282.90	252.50	232.50
Operating Margin (%)	12.3	11.5	10.4	8.60	9.50	10.70
Total Net Income	494.5	390.6	268.3	215.10	181.20	94.60
Net Profit Margin (%)	7.8	7.4	6.6	6.50	6.80	4.40
Diluted EPS (\$)	0.61	0.47	0.34	0.54	0.46	0.25

Source: www.hoovers.com

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